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Abstract
Recent productivity studies suggest the reallocation of output across plants (between effect)
and the productivity growth at individual plants (within effect) are both important sources of
productivity growth at the industry level. Interestingly, recent evidence has shown that trade
liberalization is related to both effects. While a trade model with firm heterogeneity can explain
the between effect, it can not reproduce the within effect. We add to this model the option for
firms to costly adopt more productive technologies and show that plant productivity actually rises
in response to lower trade costs. The selection effect of trade - that some firms will be forced to exit
following trade liberalization - favours the reallocation of output across incumbent firms (between
effect) and contributes to raise the exporters’ market share. Therefore, a greater scale of operation
amplifies the firm’s return from costly productivity-enhancement investments and leads a greater
proportion of firms to undertake process-innovations (within effect).
Keywords: International Trade, Technology Adoption, Productivity
JEL codes: F12, F15, L11, O33, O47
1 Introduction
Longitudinal micro-data has revealed i) the reallocation of output across plants (between effect) and ii)
productivity growth in the individual plants/firms are two relevant sources of productivity growth at
the industry level (within effect).1
∗We are indebted to Prof. Gian Marco Ottaviano for supporting us in this research project and to prof. Wilhelm
Kohler for his comments on a early draft of this paper. We would also like to thank Prof. Robert Feenstra, Prof. Gabriel
Felbermayr, Prof. Omar Licandro, prof. Morten Ravn, Prof. Pascalis Raimondos-Møller, the EUI trading group and the
seminar-participants at the EUI, in Copenhagen and in Tuebingen for their helpful suggestions and insightful discussions.
†Current affiiation: Universidad Carlos III Madrid, C/ Madrid, 126 - 28903 Getafe Spain. Email: anto-
nio.navas@univmed.fr. Tel: +34 916249845
‡Chair of International Economics - Eberhard Karls University Tuebingen. Corresponding address: davide.sala@uni-
tuebingen.de
1See Bartelsman and Doms (2000) for a recent review of the studies using the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD).
See Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003) for evidence on the degree of heterogeneity across firms in productivity
as well as in innovation activities and export performances in nearly all industries examined. Finally the role of trade in
the success and failure of firms in developing countries is reviewed by Tybout (2000).
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The first effect is at the heart of the recent literature on heterogenous-firm models pioneered by
Melitz (2003) and Bernard et. al. (2003). These models predict heterogenous responses to reduced
trade costs across firms, including entry into exporting by some and increased failure by others. As
a result, when trade costs fall, industry productivity rises both because low-productive non-exporting
firms exit and because high-productive firms are able to expand through exporting. In these models, it
is the reallocation of activity across firms - not intra-firms productivity growth - that boosts industry
productivity.
In contrast, the aim of our paper is to stress the gains via the second microeconomic channel (ii),
focusing on endogenous technology adoption within firms, but still building on a heterogenous firms
modelling setup. We show that plant productivity actually rises in response to lower trade costs, a result
beyond the existing literature and motivated by the empirical relevance that within-plant productivity
improvements play in the productivity growth of an industry.
For instance, the right shift of the Canadian productivity distribution of manufacturing firms in 1996
compared to 1988 following the Canada-U.S. FTA documented in Trefler (2005) can be ascribed to both
effects. Low productive firms that either exit or downsize following trade liberalization shrink the left
tail of the distribution in 1996 relative to 1988, while high productive firms expanding their foreign sales
through exporting contribute to the fatter right tail of the (size weighted) distribution in 1996 (between
effect).
This does not exhaust the contribution of trade to aggregate productivity gains at the industry level.
As reported in Trefler (2004), U.S. trade concessions to Canada has led to increases in productivity at
surviving plants, contributing considerably to the thicker right tail of the distribution in 1996 too (within
effect).
This effect is what Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (FHK, henceforth, 2001) call the "within" effect
in their decomposition of the aggregate productivity growth and it constitutes the bulk of overall labour
productivity growth in industrial economies. Likewise - as studied by Bustos (2005) - Argentinian
exporters have adopted more innovative technologies after Argentina’s trade liberalization of the 90s
and - as reported by Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) - plant-productivity improvements are associated
to declining industry-level trade costs in the US manufacturing industry.
Moreover, all these studies reveal that within-plant productivity growth was stronger among the
group of exporters and among the most export oriented industries. This suggests that there is selection
on the basis of innovation status and leads us to model firm’s heterogeneity in productivity levels, so
that the innovation type can be identified and her responses to trade reforms analyzed. This can not be
achieved in the simpler Krugman (1980) setup, as all firms are equally productive and no firm-selection
on the innovation status is possible.
We add a technology-adoption choice into the Melitz (2003)’s framework. After entry into the
industry, all firms have the option to implement a more productive technology at the expense of higher
"implementation" costs or adoption costs.
We think broadly of the adoption of a new technology, including the introduction of a new man-
agement, the re-organization of labour, the qualification and training of employees and leading to the
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reduction of the unit-cost of production. Hence, the intra-firm productivity increase is modeled as a
costly investment within the firm to reduce its marginal cost of production and we shall assume there
are no technological spillover across firms, as in Cohen and Klepper (1996a) and (1996b). This implies
that the return of a process innovation due to a reduction of the variable costs is positively related to
the number of internal applications which depends on the firm’s scale.
Trade liberalization entails an improved and/or new access to product markets as well as an increased
number of competitors. As a result, domestic exporters increase their combined market share, as
they conquer part of the exiting firm’s market as well as they gain a freer access to foreign markets.
Therefore, by raising the scale of production of some exporters, trade strengthens their incentive for
vertical innovation. This leads a group of exporters, who ex-ante were not productive enough to perform
vertical R&D, to raise their productivity.
This is the new and main result of our model and, mostly important, not only holds true in the
transition from autarky to trade (i.e. when a country first opens to trade), but it also applies when
transportation costs - a proxy for trade barriers.- are reduced. Hence, it applies to incomplete steps of
trade liberalization or partial tariff reforms, of which the Canada-US Free Trade Area (CUSFTA) and
Argentinian trade liberalization of the 90s are two examples. This result allows to relate our model to
the available evidence in Bernard (2006), Trefler (2004) and Bustos (2005).
The model is closely related to Bustos (2005), although our motivation and aim are different from
hers. In common, they have the relation between the engagement of a firm in trade with the adoption of
a more productive technology. Indeed, in both models firms are confronted with the option of adopting
an alternative technology to the current employed, featuring a lower variable cost, but a higher fixed
cost. While in Bustos (2005), the alternative technology is common to all firms, in our framework the
alternative technology is firm-specific, matching the evidence on site-to-site variations in the success of
implementing new technologies (e.g. Coming (2007) and Bikson et. al. (1987)).
In this respect, our model is similar to Helpam, Melitz and Yeaple (HMY henceforth, 2004) where
the proximity-concentration trade-off determines whether a firm opts for FDI or exporting as a mode to
serve a foreign market. In our framework, the trade off being between efficiency-implementation costs
and shaping the firm’s choice between two its alternative technologies (modes of production).
A second important difference with Bustos (2005) is that we present a general equilibrium set up
rather than resting on a partial equilibrium approach. The new insight is that trade can both favour or
deter technology-adoption as opposed to always favour it as it occurs in the partial equilibrium analysis.
On one hand, trade lowers the cost to benefit ratio of implementing a more productive technology because
it increases the access to foreign markets and therefore it increases the total demand for a firm’s product.
On the other, trade increases competition on the goods market (i.e. lower the demand for the firm’s
product) and it is a costly activity, putting grater pressure on the scarce input resources. This leads
to a higher real wage and, overall, to a higher cost to benefit ratio of technology implementation. The
latter effect - which is offsetting the former positive effect of trade - is absent in the partial equilibrium
analysis.
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We shall show the former can dominate the latter and therefore, when trade costs fall, productivity
can increase at the plant level, in particular among the low-productive exporters.
This is one difference with Yeaple (2005) where all exporters adopt necessarily the more innovative
technology and therefore, no selection on the basis of innovation status is possible. In his model, the
reduction of transportation costs can only lead the domestic producers to adopt an innovative technology.
This model has some feedback for productivity studies, which are hardly related to trade. Our
model suggests that a greater degree of openness in the trading relations can be partly responsible for
the importance of the "within" component for the productivity growth in industrialized countries, as
reported by Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (BHS henceforth, 2004).
Finally, Baldwin and Nicoud (2005) have recently questioned that the positive effect of trade on
aggregate productivity derived in a static model of trade maps into a dynamic growth effect. They
highlight a static versus dynamic trade-off in terms of productivity gains: freer trade raises the aggregate
productivity level through the selection effect, but at the same time it also rises the cost of creating
new varieties since the expected survival probability into the industry is smaller. In turn, productivity
growth slows down. Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2006) have shown that this result crucially depends
on the strength of knowledge spillover assumed in the R&D technology. Our model suggests that were
firms performing vertical innovation, the selection effect could generate productivity growth by forcing
the least efficient firms out of the market and reallocating market shares across the most productive
firms. Indeed, higher market shares incentive process-innovation leading to productivity growth.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model in the closed economy to be compared
with the open economy in Section 3. This comparison is illustrative of the effects of trade on the aggregate
productivity growth to be confronted with the available evidence. Section 4 discusses some drawbacks
of the model and possible solutions to them. Finally the last section concludes.
2 The Closed Economy
In this section we extend Melitz (2003) to incorporate technology adoption.
Preference
Our economy is populated by a continuum of households of measure L, whose preferences are given






where the measure of the set Ω represents the mass of available goods, 0 < ρ < 1. Each household is
endowed with one unit of labour which is inelastically supplied at the given wage w. The maximization
of utility subject to the total expenditure R =
R
ω∈Ω
p(ω)q(ω)dω yields the demand function for every
single variety ω:
q(ω) = A [p(ω)]
−σ (1)
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where A represents the demand level which is exogenous from the point of view of the individual

















σ = 1/(1− ρ) > 1
is the elasticity of substitution across varieties.2
Technology
Each variety is produced by a single firm according to a technology for which the only input is labour.
The total amount of labour required to produce the quantity q(ω) of the final good ω is given by
l(ω) = fD + cq(ω) (2)
where fD is the fixed labour requirement and c ∈ [0, c] the firm-specific marginal labour requirement3.
Entry - Exit
There is a large (unbounded) pool of prospective entrants into the industry and prior to entry, all
firms are identical. To enter the industry, a firm must make an initial investment, modeled as a fixed
cost of entry fE > 0 measured in labour units, which is thereafter sunk. An entrant then draws a
labour-per-unit-output coefficient c from a known and exogenous distribution with cdf G(c) and density
function g(c) on the support [0, c]. Upon observing this draw, a firm has three options. Like in Melitz
(2003), it may decide to exit or to produce. If the firm does not exit and/or produces, it bears the fixed
overhead labour costs fD. Additionally to Melitz (2003), by investing fI units of labour, it can opt
for adopting a more productive technology and produce at a lower cost γc (γ < 1). Ultimately, it is a
choice among a well established technology ("baseline") - characterized by low "implementation" costs
- normalized to 0 - and variable costs of production c - and, an innovative one - featuring lower variable
costs (γc), but higher fixed cost of adoption (fI). The trade-off being between efficiency-implementation
costs, much like of the proximity-concentration trade off for horizontal FDI in HMY (2004).
We are assuming that technological uncertainty and heterogeneity of the Melitz-type relates to
what we have called a "baseline" technology, reflecting that firms have to learn about their market
and their productivity before they can plan to improve it. Having found out about their idiosyncratic
productivity, all firms face the option of adopting an alternative technology, what we have referred
2A is an endogenous variable to be determined in equilibrium, but it is a constant from the point of view of an individual
supplier because of the monopolistic competition assumptions. Indeed, each variety supplier ignores that her behavior can
affect the price or the quantity index, and therefore it takes A as given when it maximizes its profits.
3Clearly, this technology exhibits increasing return to scale. fD can be thought as all those activities like marketing
or setting up a sales network which are independent of the scale of production. Then, it can be seen as the fixed cost of
serving the domestic market. The inverse of c is a measure of a firm’s productivity in the production process.
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to as the "innovative" one. While the extra fixed cost is the same for each firm, the reduction in
variable cost is proportional to the firm’s idiosyncratic "marginal cost draw" given from its own entry.
Since the Melitz-type entry leads to heterogeneity in variable cost, the technological option results
also differently attractive for different firms, relative to their "baseline" technologies. This could be
rationalized as some firms being more successful than others in implementing the new technology. Indeed,
technology-adoption requires an active engagement of the adopter - namely a series of investments
undertaken by the adopter - beyond the selection of which technology to adopt. These investments are
often label "technology implementation process" which are in the data the main source of site-to-site
variations in the success (productivity) of the adopter, better implementation makes new technologies
more productive.4
The consumers may benefit from this form of innovation in the form of a reduction of good prices.
We shall refer sometimes to this reduction of costs in the production stage with an abuse of terminology
as process or vertical innovation .
Finally, as in Melitz (2003) every incumbent faces a constant (across productivity levels) probability
δ in every period of a bad shock that would force it to exit.
Prices and Profits
A producer of variety ω with labour-output coefficient c faces the demand function (1) and charges
the profit maximizing price:
p(ω) =
σ
σ − 1wc ≡ pD(c) (3)
where σσ−1 is the constant markup factor and w is the common wage rate, hereafter taken as the
numeraire (w = 1). The effective price (3) charged to consumers by non-innovator is higher than








and likewise, qI(c) = γ−σqD(c) for an innovator. Therefore, the profit of firm type D (producer with a








− fD − δfI = B(γc)1−σ − fD − δfI (6)






a constant by a single producer and it represents the level of demand in the country. The innovation cost
fI into the profit function is weighted by the exogenous probability of exiting, because the innovation
decision occurs after firms learn about their productivity c and since there is no additional uncertainty
or time discounting other than the exogenous probability of exiting, firms are indifferent between paying
4See Comin (2007) and Bikson et. al. (1987).
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the one time investment cost fI or the per-period amortized cost δfI . We shall adopt the latter notation
for analytical convenience.
For illustrative purpose, let us consider in figure 1 the profit profiles associated to the two possible
technology choice. From the prospect of a single firm, (5) and (6) are linear in c1−σ which can be
interpreted as a firm’s productivity index: the higher it is, the greater the productivity of a firm.5
Given the fix overhead cost of innovation and that the profit of an innovator is always steeper than
a non-innovator’s one, technology adoption will be profitable only for high-productivity firms. Firms
with draws below (co)
1−σmake negative profit and have to exit, while firms with productivity index
above (co)
1−σ entry successfully. Only a fraction of these firms (c1−σ ≥ (cI)1−σ), perform also process-
innovation.
Using (4) and (3), we have the ratio of any two firms’s output and revenues only depend on the ratio

















(7) has some interesting implications. First, dividing numerator and denominator of the quantity ra-
tio by Q and the numerator and the denominator of the revenue ratio by R, we can conclude that relative
market shares of the firms depends only on the cost ratio and are independent of aggregate variables.
Second, rI(c)/rD(c) > 1, that is rent increases more than proportionally following the introduction of
process innovations.6










andM is the mass of incumbent firms in the economy. G(cI)G(co) (
G(co)−G(cI)
G(cI)
) is the ex-ante (prior to entry)
probability of being an innovator (non innovator). In other words, it represents the probability for a
potential entrant to innovate (to entry). By the law of large numbers, it also represents the fraction of
innovating (not-innovating) firms in the economy.
M =MI +MD is also the total mass of available varieties to the consumers in this closed economy.
2.1 Equilibrium in a closed economy
We are interested in a stationary equilibrium where the aggregate variables must also remain constant
over time. This requires a mass Me of new entrants in every period, such that the mass of successful
entrants, MeG(co), exactly replaces the mass δM of incumbents who are hit by the bad shock and exit,
as in Melitz (2003).
5B is an endogenous variable of the model and it is a non linear function of c. However, from a single firm’s prospect,
B is taken as given and therefore, it can be treated as a constant. This graph can not be used for comparative statistic
or to pin down equilibrium values, but it is useful to understand the behavior of a firm with a productivity draw c.
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Figure 1: Profits from producing and innovating on the domestic market.
The equilibrium entry cost-cutoff co and innovation cost-cutoff cI must satisfy:
πD(co) = 0⇐⇒ B (co)1−σ = fD (10)
πI(cI) = πD(cI)⇐⇒ (γ1−σ − 1)B (cI)1−σ = δfI (11)
Since their productivity is unrevealed upon entry, firms will compare the expected profit in the
industry with the entry cost, taking into account the possibility of being hit by a bad shock. Free entry





















which states that firms equate the per-period expected profit from entering and the equivalent
amortized per-period entry cost. To develop a better intuition of (12), let us denote by π the average






πD(c)dG(c) = G(co)π - in words, the expected average
profit in the industry is the average profit in the industry (π) times the ex-ante probability of entry






It shows that following an increase in the per-period entry cost δfE , firms are willing to enter if they
can expect either a higher per period average profit or greater chances of entry (higher co).
(10) to (12) characterize the equilibrium cost-cutoffs co and cI as well as B.












where δfIγ1−σ−1 is the cost to benefit ratio of innovation. The numerator is the per-period cost of innovation
while the denominator represents the revenue differential of innovation per unit of revenue initially
earned. It follows that a necessary and sufficient condition to have selection into the innovation status
is Ψ > 1, which is assumed to hold throughout since the empirical evidence suggests that only a subset
of more productive firms undertakes process innovations7.
Given (14), (12) is a function of only co. The equilibrium is depicted in figure 2, where the flat line
δfE crosses the LHS of (12) which is monotonically increasing from 0 to infinity in c, as proved in the








Figure 2: Determination of the equilibrium entry cost cutoff as given by the Free Entry Condition
More interesting is an increase of fD - the degree of increasing return to scale - or, alternatively,
conceivable as the cost of staying in the industry. Its increase makes survival into the industry harder
for all firms and, therefore, it ultimately determines selection in our economy. This thought experiment
has strong analogies to the effects of trade liberalization in our open economy analyzed next, as - in
common - they both have that they make survival of domestic firms harder (selection effect). More
7See for instance Parisi et. al. (2005) for evidence on Italian firms and Baldwin et al. (2004) for evidence on Canada.
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specifically, a greater fD lowers Ψ, but it also shifts up the LHS curve in fig. 2, so that it reduces the
entry cost-cutoff to c
0
o (see(41) in the appendix). Overall, the effect of an increase in fD on the innovation
productivity cutoff (cI)
1−σ is ambiguous since Ψ is lower, but (co)
1−σ is larger. This ambiguity is a
specific-feature of a general equilibrium model, whereas in partial equilibrium the effect of fD would be
well determined and would affect the economy only through Ψ. The intuition comes from inspecting
(5) and (6). A larger fD reduces the profits of all firm types in the economy for any given c, forcing
the least productive firms out of the market given that they are unable to recoup the increased fixed
cost of operation. Ceteris paribus (for a given cI), the price index P - reflecting firms interactions and
competition in the monopolistic-competitive market - increases (see the appendix) because of firm exiting
and reduced competition at the industry level. Incumbent firms, including innovators, benefit in terms of
higher profits, as captured by a higher B. This is the pro-innovation effect through selection behind the
reduction of Ψ. Selection reduces the mass of firms in the market, making possible for incumbent firms to
expand their output and, consequently, increase their profits. In turn, higher profits incentive technology
adoption and trigger entry by prospective firms responding to higher potential returns associated with
a good productive draw. The increased labour demand by the more productive firms and new entrants
puts upward pressure on the labour-factor market, leading to a higher real wage (1/P ). This feeds back
to firms’ profits, reducing them again through the B. This is the general equilibrium effect via the factor
market behind the rise in c1−σo and it would be absent in partial equilibrium since the equilibrium wages
are unchanged.
These two offsetting forces on the innovation activity will also be at play in the more complex scenario
of an open economy which undergoes through trade liberalization.
fD has ambiguous effects also on the number of varieties in the economy, whereas in Melitz (2003)
increasing fD unambiguously reduces the number of firms in the the industry. As shown in the appendix,











so that when fD rises, a larger π and G(co) contribute to reduce the number of varieties8. However,
only when cI rises, the total number of firms unambiguously declines.
There is an other difference between our economy and the economy in Melitz (2003), namely the entry
productivity cutoff level is higher in this setting.9 The possibility to innovate allows the most efficient
firms that perform process innovation to "steal" market shares to the least efficient firms for which is
harder to survive into the market. Consequently, our economy is more efficient, because some varieties
are produced at a lower cost, but less varied because some varieties have disappeared. This trade-off
has been well emphasized in the growth literature (see Peretto (1998) and more recently Gustafsson and
Segerstrom (2006)).
8Recall that a larger fD entails a lower co. A lower co translates into higher π - by (13) - and lower G(co).
9The proof of this result has been left to the appendix.
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3 The Open Economy
Let us assume that the economy under study can trade with other n ≥ 1 symmetric countries. We will
assume that trade is not free, but it involves both fixed and variable costs, since free trade could simply
be analyzed by doubling L in the closed economy. One can think of the fixed cost associated to trade
as the cost of customizing its own variety to the regulations and tastes of foreign countries as well as of
creating sale-networks. The variable trade costs are trade barriers such as transportation costs imposed
by distance. We follow a long tradition in the trade literature and model these variable costs in the
iceberg formulation: τ > 1 units of a good must be shipped in order for 1 unit to arrive at destination.
Finally, the symmetry of countries is required to ensure that factor price equalization holds and
countries have indeed a common wage which can be still taken as the numeraire. Alternatively, a freely
traded homogenous good produced under constant return to scale could be introduced to pin down
its price and thus the wage to unit in all countries. The symmetry assumptions also ensures that all
countries share the same aggregate variables.
Prices,Profits and Firm-Types
The variable costs of trade are naturally reflected into the price charged by the domestic exporters into
foreign markets. By symmetry, the imported products are more expensive than domestically produced
goods due to transportation costs. As a result, the effective consumer price for imported products from
any of the n countries is:
pX(c) = τpD(c) (16)
while an exporter who has opted for process innovation charges:
pXI(c) = γpX(c) (17)
Analogously, the profits of an exporter and an innovator-exporter in a foreign market are10 :
πX(c) = τ
1−σBc1−σ − δfX (18)
πXI(c) = (γτ)
1−σBc1−σ − δfX (19)
where δfX is the amortized per-period fixed cost of the overhead fixed cost fX that firms have to pay
(in units of labour) to export to foreign markets.
The following table summarizes the profit function for all possible firm-types with productivity c.
type Domestic Producer Exporter
Non Innovator πD(c) πD(c) + nπX(c)
Innovator πI(c) πI(c) + nπXI(c)




− δfX = τ
1−σrD(c)
σ




(γτ)1−σBc1−σ − δfX .
Note we account for the entire overhead production cost in the domestic profit (see (5) and (6)). This choice is
uninfluential for the equilibrium as all firms (domestic producers and exporters) will produce also for the domestic market
and incur fD upon staying into the industry.
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No firm will ever export and not also produce for its domestic market. Indeed, any firm would
earn strictly higher profits by also producing for its domestic market since the associated variable profit
rD(c)/σ is always positive and the overhead production cost fD is already incurred. Then, all exporters’
profits can be separated into the portion earned domestically (πD(c) or πI(c)) and on each of the foreign
market (πX(c) or πXI(c)). Moreover, since the export cost is assumed equal across countries, a firm
will either export to all n countries in every period or never export.
Finally, not all four types can coexist simultaneously in the economy, but which firm type is active
will depend on the kind of selection. The empirical evidence suggests that exporting and innovation
are performed by the most productive firms (lowest cost levels), while domestic producers are typically
smaller, less innovative and less productive. Accordingly, we shall focus on the selections with the
exporters or the innovators being the most productive types. In selection BW in figure 3, exporting
is relatively cheaper than innovating and therefore only the more productive exporters can undertake
vertical innovation: an innovating firm is necessarily an exporter (XI-type), but there are exporters that
are not innovators (X-type).11 Indeed, from (18) and (19) it easy to check that if the X-type is making
positive profit from exporting, then also the XI-type does necessarily so. However, no innovator would
produce and innovate just for the domestic market (no I-type) because given her high productivity she





Figure 3: Plausible selections
On the contrary, in selection B only a fraction of incumbents innovate (I-type) and only a subset of
innovators become exporters (XI-type). No firm will ever export without innovating (no X- type). In-
deed, firms that can take advantage of profit opportunity abroad are already innovating on the domestic
11This is different from Yeaple (2005) where the firm type adopting the innovative technology is also necessary an
exporter. In other words, the exporting firms coincides with the innovative types and therefore, no selection on the basis
of innovation status is possible.
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market. Therefore they will exploit their innovative technology to serve the foreign market as well.
BW is interesting because the marginal innovating firm is an exporter and trade is likely going to
affect its innovation decision. B represents the other side of the same coin: the marginal innovating firm
is a domestic producer and therefore, innovation is mostly determined by domestic factors and will less
likely respond to trade liberalization.
Given the aim of the paper, we focus closely on selection BW where trade induces within-plant pro-
ductivity changes besides allocative effects of market shares. Roughly stated, trade will have "between"
and "within" effects on productivity growth (from here BW ). Then, we turn to discuss briefly selection
B and highlight why trade is not influential on plants’ innovation activity. In this equilibrium, trade
affects productivity only through allocative effects - between effect (form here B).
3.1 Selection BW
Let us denote by MD the mass of active incumbent firms with a local dimension only, by MX the mass
of exporting not innovating firms and by MXI the mass of exporting and innovating firms. The sum of
all these firms (MD +MX +MXI =M) gives the mass of incumbent firms in any country. The mass of
non-innovating incumbent firms in any country isMNI =MD+MX , while MT =MD+n(MX +MXI)
gives the total mass of varieties available to consumers in any country. Let prD = [G(co)−G(cX)]/G(co),
prX = [G(cX)−G(cI)]/G(co), prXI = [G(cI)]/G(co) be the probability of becoming each type conditional
on being an incumbent.
The equilibrium - BW
We are again interested only in a stationary equilibrium where all aggregate variables are constant
over time. The stability condition imposes the entrants into the industry replaces exactly exiting firms,
i.e. δM = MeG(co). Note that the equilibrium value of the aggregate variable Q, R, and therefore A
and B as well as of the entry cutoff co is different in this equilibrium from the closed economy one.
Nevertheless we stick to same notation as they are defined in the same way.



















(γ1−σ − 1)(1 + nτ1−σ) (22)
Thus the parameter restriction that sustains this equilibrium (cI ≤ cX ≤ co) where only exporters





≥ δfXτσ−1 ≥ fD (23)
This condition requires that the innovating is relatively more expensive than exporting. That is, the
foreign markets should be fairly accessible, otherwise serving them would result extremely costly and it
could be afforded exclusively by the most productive firms.
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δfI
(γ1−σ−1) is equivalent to the cutoff for innovation for the closed economy: the same assumptions that
guarantees selection on the basis of innovation status in the closed economy (i.e., Ψ ≥ 1) ensures that
this term is positive and bounded away from zero in the open economy. Recall that this term represents
the cost to benefit ratio of innovation. Importantly, in the open economy we have an extra term given
by 1(1+nτ1−σ) which is unity in the closed economy (set n = 0 or τ →∞). The denominator represents
precisely the further revenue differential associated to innovation on each of the foreign markets that
become available with trade.
We like to think of n as the number of countries into the trading network sharing a common code of
rules as it could be for the WTO membership. Then, it represents a measure of the world’s openness to
trade, as for a low n very few countries have trading relations. φ = τ1−σ ∈ [0, 1] is commonly referred
in the literature as an index of the freeness of trade with values closer to 1 indexing freer trade.
Clearly, trade liberalization that come in the form of either freer trade (greater φ) or greater world
openness (larger n) can affect process innovation weighing upon the return of innovation.
(20) to (22) give a system of 3 equations in 4 unknowns (co,cX ,cI ,B). We can use the FE condition
to close this system and uniquely determine the entry cutoff. The FE condition ensures the equivalence






(πD(c) + nπX(c))dG(c) +
cIR
0
(πI(c) + nπXI(c))dG(c) = δfE (24)
Combining appropriately the three conditions for the cutoff points ((20) to (22)), the relation between




























Note that Ψ = Ψf (1 + nτ1−σ) and ΨfX = Ψ
ffD/δfXτ
σ−1. Ψ ≥ Ψf - namely, the cost to benefit
ratio is smaller in the trading equilibrium than in autarky - reflects that trade and vertical innovation
are related: new market opportunities abroad induce exporters to expand their scale of operation and
the benefits of cost-reducing innovation are spread on a greater number of units sold, while the up-
front cost of innovation is unchanged.12 Comparing (25) with (14) shows that the distance between the
entry productivity index cutoff and the innovation productivity index cutoff is always smaller in the
trading equilibrium than in autarky (Ψf < Ψ), as trade reduces the relative cost of innovation. Hence,
trade (for positive n and non-prohibitive transportation cost τ) reduces, ceteris paribus,the innovation
productivity cutoff (cI)
1−σand therefore it boosts within-plant innovation. This is the partial equilibrium
effect described also in Bustos (2005).13
12Only for prohibitive trade barriers (φ = 0) or a close world (n = 0), Ψ = Ψf .
13This situation would describe an industry within the economy which is small enough to affect the equilibrium price
index of the economy, and therefore, real wages and where no entry and exit takes place.
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However, this is not enough for concluding the proportion of incumbents undertaking productivity
innovation will be larger after trade. In general equilibrium, trade affects also the entry productivity
cutoff (co)
1−σ which results higher in the trading equilibrium than in autarky, as it is shown in the
appendix.
In this equilibrium, two forces are affecting the innovation cost cutoff when the economy opens to
trade:
i) the selection effect of trade reduces the incentive to perform process innovation because entry is
less likely and survival more difficult in a more competitive environment - lower co. Trade increases
competition on the domestic market and forces the least productive producers out of the market
(selection effect). The most hurt are obviously the domestic firms that produce exclusively for the
national market whose product demand is reduced without being compensated by the expansion
of their product demand on the foreign markets.
ii) conditional on being an incumbent, the benefit of cost-reducing innovation is higher after trade
because the selection effect and the scale effect together increase exporters’ total market shares.
Thus, some incumbent will start performing vertical innovation - Ψf < Ψ.
The overall effect of trade on innovation is ambiguous and depends on the relative strength of these
pushing and deterring factors of process innovation, similarly to the effect of an increase in fD above.
Although the proportion of incumbents is reduced (lower co), the proportion of innovating firms among
them will raise (higher cI) if the ii) dominates i), namely if the adjustments through the extensive
margin of innovation dominate those through the extensive margin of trade.
In order to shed some light on which effect dominates, we use a specific parametrization for G(c). We
shall show that the net outcome of these two offsetting forces is a higher proportion of firms performing
process innovation with freer trade.
Assuming that the productivity draws (1/c) are distributed according to a Pareto distribution with





, k > σ − 1, k > 2. (28)
This formulation has been used widely in many extensions of Melitz (2003) because it allows to
derive closed form solutions for the cutoff levels.14 k is a shape parameter indexing the dispersion of
cost draws. k = 1, corresponds to the uniform distribution. As k increases, the distribution is more
concentrated at higher cost level and firms’ heterogeneity is reduced. k > 2 ensures that the second
moment of the distribution is well defined, while k > σ − 1 ensures the first moment of the truncated
distribution ((31) and (32) in the Appendix) exists and is well defined. With this assumption, we are
able to prove trade liberalization favours technology adoption by some exporters, as established in the
following proposition.
14See for example Melitz and Ottaviano (2005).
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Proposition 1 Denote with cAI (c
f
I ) the equilibrium innovation cost cutoff in autarky (in the open
economy). If (28) and (23) hold, then the innovation cost cutoff in the open economy is larger than in




Interestingly the reallocation of output across plants induced by trade - between effect - is playing a
key role and is related to fX . In absence of it and with CES preferences, trade liberalization does not
have an impact on cI . Without selection to export markets (fx = 0), all firms exports and perfectly
compensates for the loss in the domestic market shares with gains in foreign market shares, since the
increase in each firm’s market size after trade is exactly offset by the rise in the number of competitors.
This can be easily checked inspecting the equilibrium conditions. With fx = 0, (20) becomes (1 +
nτ1−σ)Bc1−σo = fD which together with (22) and (24) characterize the equilibrium and determines (co,
cI , B). It is easy to show that such equilibrium is equivalent to the autarky one described by (10)-(12), so
that no firms using the baseline technology opts to implement the innovative technology after engaging
in trade. However, when fX > 0, there is selection on the export-status with only some firms engaging in
exporting, while the least productive ones having only a domestic dimension. This means that, following
trade liberalization, the increase in market size for the exporting firms is not longer offset by the raised
number of competitors. As opposed to fx = 0, some domestic exporters are enjoying a larger slice of the
foreign market (and higher revenues from foreign market) as they are not facing the competition from
the actual domestic producers (previously also exporting) and, at the same time, (by symmetry) are
confronted with less foreign competitors on the national market. This is the basic economic intuition
behind ii) above and it is strictly related to the existence of fixed trade costs.
Nevertheless, firms willing to engage in trade and incurring fX , as well as firms switching to the
"innovative" technology and incurring fI exacerbates the competition for the scarce labour input pushing
up the real wage, making survival tougher, and exporting and innovating more costly (i, above). This
deterring effect of innovation occurs through the input-factor market and, therefore, only in a general
equilibrium setting. It would be necessarily absent in a partial equilibrium approach since the equilibrium
wage in the industry are unaffected, as in Bustos (2005).
Yet, trade translates into net gains for the most productive non-innovating exporting firms, inducing
them to implement the innovative technology, as we can conclude from showing that ii is dominating
i. As low productive domestic firms exit, their market shares are reallocated to the more productive
surviving incumbents, and thus, also to some domestic exporters (extensive margin effect or selection
effect). This effect adds up to the intensive-margin effect or scale effect - that following trade liberal-
ization, some exporters have increased their market share abroad. As a result, their combined market
share (the sum of the domestic and foreign market shares) enlarges. Since a larger scale of operation is
associated to a greater return of the "technological option", a larger fraction of them finds profitable to
implement the innovative equipment. In other words, trade affects the extensive margin of innovation
inducing exporting firms that are not as productive as former innovators, to adopt more productive
technologies.
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We would expect that the reduction of transportation costs which lead to trade creation in this
model have similar effects on innovation, consistently with the evidence in Bernard et. al. (2006). This
is established in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 Assume (28) and (23) hold, dcI/dτ ≤ 0.
Proof. See in the appendix
Its relevance is that trade liberalization taking the form of partial tariff reform, as often it is in
practice, induce similar positive effect on process innovation. For instance, we can evaluate the effects
of Canada-US FTA (CUSFTA) on within firm performances. τ in (25) is the transportation cost faced
by Canadian manufacturing firms exporting to US. The model predicts US tariff concessions granted to
Canada - a reduction of τ - after the FTA would induce some Canadian exporters to innovate, as they
can take advantage of a lower cost to benefit ratio. This is consistent with the evidence shown in Trefler
(2004). The numbers are quite substantial: "U.S. tariff concessions raised labor productivity by 14 percent
or 1.9 percent annually in the most impacted, export-oriented group of industries". Bustos (2005) find
evidence of adoption of innovative technology by Argentinean manufacturing exporting firms following
the substantial trade liberalization of the country in the 90s. Interestingly, firms adopting the innovative
technology are the high productive non-innovating exporters, while the low productive exporters keep
the "traditional" technology even after trade liberalization, providing empirical support for the relevance
of selection BW analyzed here.15
Summing up, by increasing the scale of production of some of the exporters, trade increases what
Cohen and Klepper (1996) call the "ex ante" output - the firm’s output when it conducts process
innovation. This, in turn, raises firms’ incentive to innovate and triggers process-innovation, productivity
increments and market share growth at firm level (see (7)). This is consistent with Baldwin and Gu
(2003) and Trefler (2004) who find that within-firm productivity increments have occurred mostly among
exporters. Moreover, Baldwin (2004) finds empirical support for such casual link: vertical innovation is
a main determinant of productivity growth and productivity growth induces market share growth16.
Finally, the reduction of transportation costs has contrasting effect on cX too. A reduction of trade
barriers have a direct effect and lowers the exporting productivity cutoff c1−σX (see (27)), but also an
indirect effect through (co)
1−σ which rises this threshold. The following lemma shows that the direct
effect dominates the indirect one.
Lemma 3 Assume (28) holds, dcX/dτ ≤ 0.
Proof. See the appendix
15Also in Yeaple (2005), lower transportation costs induce a greater adoption of the innovative technology. However, no
exporters retain the old technology as found in Bustos (2005).
16Baldwin (2004) finds Canadian process-innovators had productivity growth that was 3.6 percentage points higher than
Canadian non-process innovators (table 9). Moreover, a within-firm productivity increment of 10% relative to the industry
average translate into almost 2% gain in the firm’s market share (table 12).
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In the context of CUSFTA, this lemma predicts that some Canadian manufacturing firms which
are not as productive as established exporters, will also start to serve the US market in virtue of the
American preferential tariff reform. Interestingly, Baldwin et al. (2003) find evidence of this.
3.2 Selection B
We shall just show that trade in this equilibria can not affect the extensive margin of innovation as for
selection BW. The non-innovating firms are only the D-type, while the innovating firms are the I-type
and the XI-type, but only the latter are present on international market. There is no X-type.
The cutoff conditions for equilibrium B are:
πD(co) = 0 (29)
πI(cI) = πD(cI) (30)
πXI(cX) = 0⇔ Bc1−σX = (τγ)σ−1δfX





This equilibrium is characterized by a trading cost relatively higher than the innovating one. High
variable and fixed cost of exporting make trading a very expensive activity performed only by the most
productive firms.
Note also that (29) and (30) imply the same relation among the innovation and the entry cutoff as
in the closed economy given by (14). Indeed, the marginal innovating firm is not an exporter and the
transition from autarky to trade leaves the cost to benefit ratio of innovation unchanged. That is, trade
liberalization can not affect and stimulate firms’ innovation investments because it has no impact on Ψ.
In other words, the extensive margin of innovation responds to lower trade barriers uniquely through
the selection effect; consequently, a raise in c1−σo raises c
1−σ
I as well and depresses vertical innovation.
3.3 Final Remarks
The model has implications on the aggregate productivity level. As in Melitz (2003), the industry av-
erage productivity will be rising in the long run by means of the selection effect which spells the least
efficient firms out of the market - between effect . Moreover, in our model trade will rise the average
industry productivity through a further channel, namely the within effect (Proposition 1 and Lemma 2).
Following trade liberalization, some of the exporters opt for implementing a more efficient technology,
improving their productivity level. The right shift of the Canadian productivity distribution of manu-
facturing firms in 1996 compared to 1988 following the Canada-U.S. FTA documented in Trefler (2005)
can be interpreted as the combination of the between effect and of the within effect. Low productive
firms - below the industry average - that either exit or downsize following trade liberalization - between
component - determine a thinner left tail of the distribution in 1996 relative to 1988. Analogously, the
reallocation of market shares favouring high productive firms has contributed to a fatter right tail of
the distribution of 1996.
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The exporters who have raised their plant productivity (within component) significantly determine
the increased mass on medium and high productivity levels for the distribution in 1996 relative to the
one in 1988.
Moreover, such liberalization encourages also new Canadian exporters that are less productive than
old Canadian exporters to enter the US market (Lemma 3). This must reduce the industry average
productivity as the expansion in the US market increases the market share of lower productivity new
exporters.
Finally the model suggests that trade liberalization and the geography of a country can interact
each other: the same trade liberalization may induce different innovation outcomes depending on the
location of a country.
Moving from B to BW, the cost of exporting relative to the cost of innovating decreases. This
means that the effect trade has on the process innovation will be differentiated according to the level
of transportation cost. We shall interpret high transportation cost as a proxy for the remoteness of the
Home economy from the main exporting markets or, more generally, as the level of trade barriers faced
by the Home country.
If in the transition from autarky to trade, the country is fairly remote and faces selection B, then
process innovation performed will be reduced, as discussed above. On the contrary, if the country is
close to the exporting markets and selection BW is possible, process innovation increases.
4 Caveats and Further Research
We have modeled the process innovation very simply as a binary decision - adopt/not adopt the new
productive technology. The benefit and the cost of innovation are known and exogenously given. This
introduces two major limitations.
First, more innovation in this economy is measured by the changes in the proportion of firms in-
novating and therefore is related uniquely to the extensive margin of innovation. In other words, the
intensity of innovation is out of the model as firms do not decide upon their productivity target.
Second, all innovators improve their productivity in the same proportion. This means that the
mass of firm with cost levels in the range [γcI , cI ] has measure zero and the ex-post innovation cost
distribution of incumbent-firms has a hole.
One way around the latter problem which preserves the innovation decision as exogenous would be
introducing γ as a continuous random variable. Firms would pay the cost of innovation to draw a γ.
Instead, we are currently working to make the innovation decision endogenous: firms that opt for
vertical innovation, choose optimally their γ balancing the benefits with the costs of innovation. Not
only this avenue would solve the problem of the hole in the distribution, but it also allows to analyze
how both the intensive and the extensive margin of innovation respond to trade liberalization.
Indeed, trade would affect both who is innovating and how much each firm is innovating. In equilib-
rium BW, the within effect would not be comprised of only the new innovators, but also of the former
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innovators investing more intensively in productivity increments. Interestingly, in equilibrium B, trade
may continue to be unrelated to the extensive margin on innovation, but it still could affect the intensive
margin inducing some of the innovators to innovate more. Thus, the dichotomy within and no-within
effect proper of equilibrium BW and B is a specific feature of our setup and would not survive under
this modification. Trade would affect the industry productivity growth through both the within and
the between effect in both equilibrium. However, the degree of importance of the within effect would
be different across the two equilibrium and only in equilibrium BW trade can likely weigh upon the
extensive margin of innovation.
In spite of all these limitations, this set up highlight in a simple way the trade forces related to the
within-firm productivity changes. Moreover, it is able to generate some predictions that are consistent
with the available empirical evidence.
5 Conclusion
The paper introduces process innovation into the Melitz (2003) framework. As in Melitz (2003), trade
has a selection effect on firms forcing the least productive ones out of the market and reallocating market
shares to the more productive ones. Although this contributes to the aggregate productivity growth, it
is not exhaustive of the effects of trade on productivity. We showed trade can favour the adoption of an
innovative technology, especially among exporters.
One could think that fiercer competition implied by trade can reduce the incentive for innovation.
This is certainly true for low productive domestic firms whose survival possibilities have decreased to-
gether with their market shares. Instead, exporters compensate the loss of market shares in the domestic
market with gains in market shares in foreign markets. As they expand their scale of production, their
incentive for process innovation strengthens and some of them introduce a more productive technology.
In productivity studies, this is the so called within effect - some of the incumbent firms update their
productivity - and it is a main source of labour productivity growth in industrialized countries. This is
the new insight of the model: trade contributes to the industry productivity growth through the within
effect besides through the between effect. More generally, a greater openness in the trading relations
can justify the finding of the great importance of the within component for the industry productivity
growth, as recently documented.
We have shown that this effect is the net outcome of two offsetting forces: one favouring innovation
and related to one side of trade liberalization, namely the opportunity of market expansion; the other one,
deterring innovation and related to the other side of the coin, namely a tougher import competition. In
particular, it was highlighted that the second effect is specific to general equilibrium as it comes through
the interactions with the input-factor market.
Finally, geography plays an important role. Trade liberalization can depress vertical innovation (equi-
librium B) for remote countries, while it can boost process-innovation (equilibrium BW ) for countries
closely located to the core of the exporting markets.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Appendix A - Closed Economy
We first proceed with the aggregation to define the aggregate variables of the economy that firms take as
given in their decisions (see (5) and (6)). Then, we turn to the analysis of the equilibrium and determine
the entry cost-cutoff and the number of varieties.
6.1.1 Aggregation
Let us denote by µD(c) and µI(c) respectively, the cost distribution of domestic producers and active















0 < c < cI
otherwise
(32)
and will be used repeatedly in the aggregation. They are not affected by the exogenous productivity δ
which affects all firms equally and it is independent of the productivity level. Finally, in order to derive













MI(γ ecI)1−σ +MDfcD1−σi (35)
(33) is the weighted average productivity index within the subgroup domestic producers, while (34) is the
"ex ante"-innovating weighted average productivity index among the subgroup of inventors17. Given that
process innovation is simply modeled as a fixed proportional reduction in the cost level, the "ex-post"
innovation weighted average productivity index will also be increased proportionally and be (γecI)1−σ.
Therefore, (35) is the weighted average productivity index of the economy which is an opportunely
weighted average of the averages prevailing in each subgroup. All these measures are independent of the
number of firms. ec is the most aggregated productivity-index and completely summarizes all aggregate
variables of the model derived below.
Using (3) for both a domestic and an innovator producer and the definition of the price index, it is
17Given that domestic (non-innovators) domestic producers do not increment their productivity level, the ex-ante and
ex-post innovation cost distribution of domestic producers coincide.
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where r and π are the average revenue and profit in the economy.
In a proof below, we shall use the average profit in autarky and we shall use the convention that
the variable with superscript A denote the equilibrium variables in the closed economy equilibrium. For








where rA is (37) evaluated at the equilibrium cost cutoff cAo and c
A
I .











6.1.2 Determination of the equilibrium
µI(c) and µD(c) are not affected by the simultaneous entry and exit since the successful entrants and
failing incumbents draw their productivity level from a common distribution and δ is independent of the
innovation status. These distributions depend exclusively on the cutoffs points for entry and innovation.
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Using (38) together with (8) and (9), it is possible to express (12) as (13), which can be further
refined and express in terms of solely co. Insert (10) and (11) into (12), replace δfI = Ψ(γ1−σ − 1)fD
and rearrange terms to get:
δfE = B
h










































6.1.3 Existence and Uniqueness of the equilibrium in the closed economy
Proposition 4 Under autarky, the equilibrium exists and is unique.
Proof. We shall prove that the RHS of (41) is monotonically increasing in co on the domain [0, c], so
that co is uniquely determined by the intersection of the latter curve with the flat line δfe in the [0, c]
space. Recall that ecI is a function of cI (see (34)), which, in turn, is a function of co by (14). Let us
define Λ = Ψ1/1−σ. Note that (14) implies:
∂cI
∂co









































































































































































= ∞. In order to show that the RHS of
(41) goes to 0 as co goes to 0, I will follow Melitz (2003) and show that the elasticities of jI(co) and
























Therefore the RHS of (41) is monotonically increasing in the space (0, c) and it must cross the horizontal
curve δfE only once. The equilibrium co exists and it is unique.
Once the unique co is determined, (31) and (32) can be determined as well as (33) to (35). By (14)
follows cI , while by (13) follows π. However, to determine the aggregate variables, we have to compute
the number of varieties.
6.1.4 Determination of the number of varieties
Labour can be employed in three activities: product innovation, process innovation and production.
The labour used for product innovation is the labour used by new entrants for investment purposes
and amounts to Le units. Lp is the labour devoted to produce a variety or make its productive process
more efficient. By full employment L = Le +Lp. The market clearing condition for product innovation
is Le = Mefe, since each of the new Me entrants pays fe units of labour. Domestic producers and
Innovators pay their workers out of revenues. Thus, the aggregate payment to production workers must
match the difference between aggregate revenue and profit:
wLp = Lp = R−Π





Then, the labour market clearing conditions implies L = Le + Lp = Π + R − Π = R, that is the
aggregate revenue consists of the aggregate consumers’ expenditure and it is exogenously limited by the
country size. Then, from (37) follows (15), with the understanding that the superscript A denotes the
autarky equilibrium value of these variables. The cutoffs and the number of varieties pin down all other
aggregate variables and complete the characterization of the unique stationary equilibrium in the closed
economy.
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6.2 Appendix B - Comparison of our entry cutoff with Melitz’s (2003) in
the closed economy
Proposition 5 Let denote c∗M as the cutoff level of marginal cost found in Melitz (2003) for the closed


































































which is not possible since, γ < 1, σ > 1, c0 > c∗M .
Q.E.D
6.3 Appendix C - Open economy - selection BW
6.3.1 Aggregation
Let µD(c) = g(c)/[G(co) − G(cX)], µX(c) = g(c)/[G(cX) − G(cI)], µXI(c) = g(c)/[G(cI)] denote the
distribution of cost level in each subgroup prior to innovation.
Defining fcD1−σ and ecI1−σsimilarly as above and letting fcX1−σ = cXR
cI
c1−σµX(c)dc and MDfcD1−σ +













where ec1−σ is again the weighted average productivity index of the economy.
Similarly,
R = MNIrD(gcNI) +MXIγ1−σrD( ecI) + n(MXrX(fcX) +MXIγ1−σrX( ecI)) (47)
= M
£
(1− prXI)rD(gcNI) + prXIγ1−σrD(ecI) + n(prXrX(fcX) + prXIγ1−σrX(ecI))¤| {z }
r
= MT rD(ec)
where MS =MprS , S = NI,X,XI was used.
Finally, the overall average - across all domestic firms - of combined profit is very similar and given
by:











where the last equality follows from substituting for the π’s in the first line and using the expression for
r.
In a proof below, we shall use the average profit in the BW equilibrium and we shall use the
convention that the variable with superscript f denote the equilibrium variables in the open economy
equilibrium. For example the average profit in the trading equilibrium will be:















6.3.2 Existence and Uniqueness of the trading equilibrium
(20) to (22) as well as (25) and (26) allow us to rearrange the FE conveniently for the characterizing



















































































Proposition 6 Assume (23) holds. In the open economy, the equilibrium arising under selection BW
exists and is unique.
Proof. We proceed similarly as in the proof for the closed economy and we shall prove that the RHS of
(50) is monotonically increasing in co on the interval [0, c]. By (44), lI(co) is monotonically increasing
in co and lI(cX) is monotonically increasing in cX from zero to infinity on c ∈ [0, c]. In turn, cX is
increasing in co from (27). Similarly by (45), lNI(co) and lNI(cX) are monotonically increasing from 0
to infinity respectively in co and cX belonging to [0, c]. Hence, the RHS of (50) is a monotonic increasing
function from 0 to ∞ in the [0, c] space, while the LHS is a flat line. The equilibrium cost-cutoff level
co must then be unique.
6.3.3 Comparison of the entry cost-cutoff in autarky and in trade
To compare the equilibrium entry cost-cutoff of autarky cAo with the one arising in the BW -equilibrium
































The first term of the RHS in (51) is exactly the same as in the closed economy. If Γ were 0, (41) and
(51) would yield the same solution, i.e. cfo = c
A
o . Since Γ is positive the curve representing the RHS of
(51) must lie above the curve representing the RHS of (41), implying a lower entry cost-cutoff in the
trading equilibrium than in the autarky equilibrium. That is, cfo ≤ cAo .
6.3.4 Proposition 1 - In BW, trade increases the proportion of firms performing process-
innovation
Proposition 1. If (28) and (23) hold, then the innovation cutoff in the open economy is lower than in
autarky (i.e cfI < c
A
I ).





where π̄f is (49).
Using (13) and (52) combined with (28) it is possible to write the ratio of the average profit in the




















Let us make some convenient transformations. Recalling that:
Ψf =
δfI
(γ1−σ − 1)(1 + nτ1−σ)fD
(53)
we define Λ = Ψ
1
1−σ , Λ∗ = Ψf
1
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Using the definition of Λ and rearranging terms we get:
π̄f =
k




fD − δfIΛk +
σ − 1
k + 1− σfD +
k
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knδfX














k + 1− σfD (55)
+
σ − 1




































fD − δfIΛk (57)
B =
σ − 1
k + 1− σfD (58)
C =
σ − 1
k + 1− σβ
knδfX (59)








σ−1 − 1)B > C
Substituting (58),(59), the inequality becomes:
(1 + nτ1−σ)
k





























since k > σ − 1 is assumed.
6.3.5 Lemma 2
Lemma 2. Assume (28) and (23) hold. Trade liberalization will have positive effects in innovation, i.e.
dcI/dτ ≤ 0.




Substitute (52) and (53) into this expression to get:
(G(cI))
−1
= (1 + nτ1−σ)
k
1−σ π̄fΘ = f
where Θ is a constant independent of τ , so that we shall ignore it because it does not affect the derivative.









Since the denominator is negative, it is enough to show dfdτ > 0 for
dcI
dτ < 0. Use (55), (57) to (59) and
recall Λ∗ = (1 + nτ1−σ)
1











where A,B,C are defined as in (57) to (59) and A is independent of τ . Using (54) and (59), it is
convenient to express C = λφ
k






σ−1 (1 + nφ)
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Since we are deriving f with respect to φ (instead of τ) and σ > 1, the numerator is negative (i.e.
df


















which satisfies our parameter restrictions (23).
6.3.6 Lemma 3
Lemma 3. Assume (28) holds. cx is monotonically decreasing in τ and fx.
Proof. Combining (27) with (28) gives the following equality:
G(cX) = β
kG(co)
Substitute (52) and (54) into this expression to get:
(G(cX))







is constant with respect to tariffs.
Proceeding similarly to the proof above, we take the total differential of both sides of (60) w.r.t. τ ,








Since the denominator is negative, we need to prove dgdτ > 0 for
dcX
dτ < 0. Substituting (55),(57),(58),(59)
into (60), g is a function given by:
g = ζτk(1 + nτ1−σ)
k
σ−1A+ ζτkB + ζτkC
or, substituting for the value of C, g can be conveniently expanded as:
g = ζ(τk(σ−1) + nτ (k−1)(σ−1))
k
σ−1A+ ζτkB +Φ
where Φ = (σ−1)nk+1−σ (δfX). It follows
dg
dτ > 0.









Note that dgdfX > 0 as
dζ
dfX
> 0, dωdfX > 0 and A,B are independent of fX . Recalling that the
denominator is negative, it follows that dcXdfX ≤ 0 - Q.E.D.
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